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Cet article conteste la notion voulant que le litige au sujet de l’article 29 découlait
de l’hostilité entre Smallwood et Diefenbaker, et il situe le différend dans le contexte
historique des relations intergouvernementales. Les deux parties avaient des visions
opposées de la façon de régler la situation financière de Terre-Neuve et, à défaut de
compter un puissant ministre fédéral provenant de cette province, Diefenbaker se
fiait à l’avis de hauts fonctionnaires du ministère des Finances. Inévitablement, la
question déboucha sur une âpre querelle. Fidèle à une pratique établie depuis
longtemps, Smallwood attaqua Ottawa avec véhémence, démontrant que les
gouvernements provinciaux sont des acteurs combatifs et ont des histoires
particulières à raconter dans la défense de leurs intérêts.
This article challenges the notion that the dispute over Term 29 resulted from the
enmity between Smallwood and Diefenbaker and considers it within the history of
intergovernmental relations. The two sides held contrasting views on how to address
Newfoundland’s fiscal position and, without a strong federal minister from the
province, Diefenbaker relied on advice of senior officials in the Department of
Finance. Inevitably, the issue erupted into a bitter feud. Smallwood followed a long-
established practice and attacked Ottawa vehemently, demonstrating that provincial
governments are aggressive actors and have particular historical narratives to tell
in the pursuit of their interests. 
WHEN NEWFOUNDLAND AND CANADA came together in 1949, both
countries shared the basic political goal of all liberal democratic states – that each
should flourish under the new constitutional arrangement outlined in the terms of
union. However, in the moment of euphoria consummating the union, officials in
both Newfoundland and Canada apparently forgot that nation-states and their
negotiated constitutions are constructed from particular needs and interests that
emerge from particular political cultures. The Canadian negotiators attempted to
reconcile the demands of Newfoundland with what Ottawa provided to the other
provinces, and they had decided in 1947 – when discussions over union began – that
Newfoundland had to fit into the existing political and constitutional mould that had
evolved since 1867; Newfoundland could not be offered terms that would create
significant differences between it and the existing provinces. The Newfoundland
negotiators, however, were determined to win special concessions by arguing for the
unique circumstances of a country that had long remained outside the Canadian
federation. They insisted on the exceptionalism of Newfoundland – the belief that it
was extraordinary because of its peculiar constitutional and economic problems –
and that it therefore should not have to conform to all of the normal rules and general
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principles of Canadian federalism. The Canadians, however, largely dismissed such
claims, especially in fiscal and financial matters. Yet having invested all of their
political capital in successfully negotiating union with Canada, the Newfoundland
delegation could hardly return home without a signed deal. Union was achieved, but
the leading members of the delegation insisted that Newfoundland’s status as the
newest province constituted a special case within Canada despite what they had
experienced in Ottawa.
With a constitutional arrangement negotiated from such different perspectives,
conflict between the federal and provincial governments was inevitable. This
occurred most clearly with Term 29. The Canadian and Newfoundland negotiators
had had considerable difficulty in 1948 in forecasting accurately the state of
Newfoundland’s fiscal capacity as a province. Consequently, they agreed in Term 29
of the Terms of Union to appoint a royal commission within eight years of union to
review the province’s financial position and make recommendations on the form and
scale of additional financial assistance, if any, that Ottawa might provide to
Newfoundland to allow it to continue the level of public service reached after union
without having to impose levels of taxation more onerous that those levied in the
Maritime Provinces. Newfoundland argued before the royal commission, when it
was appointed in 1956, that because it was a special case within Confederation the
federal government had to provide it with generous financial aid to catch up with the
Maritimes and the rest of Canada. Joseph R. Smallwood, Newfoundland’s first
premier and member of the two delegations to Ottawa (1947 and again in 1948),
insisted that during the negotiations the Canadian government had committed itself
to specific obligations and entitlements that recognized Newfoundland’s exceptional
and distinctive place in Confederation. When Ottawa refused to implement the
commission’s recommendations, Smallwood countered that not only was his
province’s prosperity being threatened but also justice and fairness were being
denied. He insisted that the underlying value of accommodation between the two
countries that had been the basis of union in 1949 had been torn asunder.1 Moreover,
he maintained the federal government had broken the promise implicit in the
constitutional understandings reached in 1949 during the talks over union: that
Ottawa was concerned for the well-being of the most vulnerable member of the
Canadian political community. Ottawa insisted it had never agreed to any such
arrangement, and Smallwood’s failure to convince the federal government after
union in 1949 to provide special treatment for Newfoundland suggests that the
federal government was consistent on that point. Smallwood had failed to secure
special deals on fisheries development, on special assistance for local manufacturers
that struggled in the face of stiff competition from Canadian imports in post-
Confederation Newfoundland, and on special tax arrangements for the province’s
pulp and paper manufacturers. Newfoundland constituted a special case, Smallwood
had argued, because of its late entry into Confederation and its poor economic and
fiscal position relative to that of the other provinces. Ottawa had dismissed his claim
in each case, insisting that Newfoundland could not be afforded any special
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consideration that was not available to any of the other provinces. Still, Smallwood
could not be dissuaded from his belief in the exceptionalism of Newfoundland in its
dealings with Ottawa.
Term 29 has become one of the most important markers in the often-troubled
relationship between Canada and Newfoundland, and one of the most vitriolic
episodes in the history of Canadian federalism – a history that includes conflict
between British Columbia and Ottawa over the building of the railway in the 1870s,
Ontario and Ottawa over issues of boundaries and property rights in the 1880s, the
Quebec government and Ottawa over a variety of shared-cost programs in the 1960s,
and the more recent confrontation between the western provinces and Ottawa over
control of natural resources.2 When the Newfoundland Royal Commission on
Renewing and Strengthening our Place in Canada issued its final report in June
2003, it noted that in the years following union Newfoundland had to rely “on the
good faith, vision and courage of successive federal governments in addressing
obstacles to its full participation in Confederation” rather than constitutional
guarantees. It described Ottawa’s refusal to meet Smallwood’s demand for generous
federal payments under Term 29 as “one of the low watermarks of the province’s
relationship with the federal government.”3
This recent royal commission did not delve into why Ottawa offered what it (the
commission) considered an inadequate solution to Term 29. Others, however, have,
and one of the most common explanations is that Prime Minister John George
Diefenbaker, along with his Progressive Conservative government, was on a
personal quest to punish Newfoundland. According to this view, he was annoyed
that it was the only province not to join the Conservative sweep in 1958 and he
resented Smallwood’s highly public campaign to secure a generous outcome to Term
29.4 Still others, such as J.G. Channing, have argued that Diefenbaker saw Term 29
as a Liberal promise to Newfoundland at the time of Confederation. Because he had
not participated in any of the negotiations, he “was evidently not unduly concerned
about assurances given to Newfoundland by a Liberal administration.”5 Richard
Gwyn, the most authoritative biographer of Smallwood, contends that Diefenbaker
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was out of touch with Newfoundland sentiment; he never bothered, for instance, to
consult his two Newfoundland MPs before he delivered his statement on Term 29 in
Parliament that declared the government’s decision as “final and irrevocable” –
words and sentiments that, incidentally, had been used consistently by federal
mandarins in their discussions of Term 29 since Ottawa had first discussed the
appointment of the royal commission.6 Smallwood’s motives have also come under
scrutiny. Newfoundland historian Sean Cadigan contends that Smallwood fought
Ottawa over Term 29 for two reasons: one, to redirect the popular anger against him
for his anti-labour legislation towards the federal government, and two, to resist
Diefenbaker’s refusal to provide the special subsidies Smallwood demanded as this
refusal threatened the inflow of federal money that Smallwood felt was needed to
build a consumer society in Newfoundland in order to succeed in his class warfare
against the working people of the province.7 These explanations focus on the
apparent personal animosity between Smallwood and Diefenbaker.8
This article considers Term 29 within the realm of the history of
intergovernmental relations and federalism in Canada. Admittedly, this is an area of
study that historians have largely ceded to political science and, even in that
discipline, the obsession with contemporary issues obscures the long and often
acrimonious history of federal-provincial relations in Canada.9 An earlier generation
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of political scientists, represented by such scholars as Richard Simeon, argued that
Canadian federalism was at its core a matter of federal-provincial diplomacy:
federalism works most effectively when it was the politics of accommodation and
compromise.10 This was achieved most successfully in the realm of executive
federalism – that is, in negotiations between first ministers who frequently found
enough common ground to settle their differences. When the federal and provincial
governments belonged to the same political party, a regional minister often
intervened to help mediate intergovernmental conflicts.11 This article contends that
in the case of Term 29 both compromise and accommodation were tossed aside, and
without a strong regional minister to represent Newfoundland’s interests within the
federal government the Diefenbaker government relied on the advice of senior
officials in the Department of Finance for its dealings with Newfoundland.
Moreover, Ottawa and Newfoundland held quite different views on how to address
Newfoundland’s relative economic and fiscal position within Canada. The inevitable
result was a bitter war waged primarily by the Newfoundland government against
the federal government. In choosing to publicly confront Ottawa, Smallwood
followed a long-established practice in Canadian federalism – one that has seen
successive provincial governments subscribe to particular historical narratives that
help them to pursue strategies aggressively in order to secure a better economic
future for their province. Smallwood donned the mantle of a Newfoundland
nationalist and invoked the exceptionalism of Newfoundland as the newest entrant
and poorest member of Confederation to demand special treatment for his province.
Newfoundland saw the resolution of Term 29 not only as Ottawa’s final
constitutional obligation from the union of the two countries, but also as a measure
of Canada’s generosity. It also saw Term 29 as a political instrument to extract better
terms from the federal government in the manner of Joseph Howe of Nova Scotia in
the late 1860s and Mitchell Hepburn of Ontario or William Aberhart of Alberta in
the 1930s. But Smallwood was not engaged in province-building – the process
whereby provincial governments attempted to expand the scope and nature of their
powers and responsibilities to play a greater role in economic and social
development of their provinces – in the manner that Alberta, Quebec, and some of
the other provinces would embrace later in the 1960s.12
For its part, the Diefenbaker government saw Term 29 – just as the previous
Liberal administration had – as part of the transitional assistance provided to the new
province that by the late 1950s had run its course. Newfoundland was now to be
treated as one of the ten provinces. Diefenbaker and his government believed that
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Newfoundland’s demand for special assistance could be addressed through new
federal-provincial financial arrangements. After all, Diefenbaker believed that he had
demonstrated through various intergovernmental agreements, especially with the
Atlantic Provinces, that he was sensitive to the fiscal needs of the economically
depressed regions of Canada. Because the two levels of government approached the
matter from completely different perspectives, they were never on the same page over
Term 29. This already difficult situation was exacerbated by a strained political
relationship between Smallwood and Diefenbaker, a relationship that would prove
largely irreconcilable when the two first ministers fought over the role of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police in a labour dispute in Newfoundland (discussed below).
Accommodation and compromise had little chance of success in such circumstances.
The delegation from Newfoundland that negotiated the terms of union with
Ottawa in 1948 had learned the limitations and constraints of Canadian federalism.
Although it had found Ottawa quite amenable to making special arrangements for
the new province on such issues as the production of oleomargarine and the
enrichment of flour, or even the placing of constitutional safeguards for
denominational education in the courts rather than with the governor in council, the
delegation found that making a case for Newfoundland exceptionalism in fiscal
matters was much more difficult. Throughout the negotiations, the Canadian cabinet
noted that “the basic premise underlying the Canadian offer to Newfoundland was
that no special terms could be offered . . . which any of the existing provinces could
claim should be extended to them.”13 Any provision that was made for
Newfoundland had to be of a temporary nature and aid only in its transition to
becoming a province. At one point in the negotiations Smallwood and Albert Walsh,
another member of the Newfoundland delegation, complained to P.A. Clutterbuck,
the British High Commissioner in Ottawa, that they had had no success in
convincing the Canadian officials of the necessity of providing generous financial
terms to allow Newfoundland to bridge the gap in the level of public service that
existed between it and that of the other provinces.14
In 1948, Canada clearly desired union with Newfoundland. It had provided $42.75
million as financial assistance on a temporary basis,15 but it was impossible to predict
with any measure of certainty the fiscal capacity of Newfoundland as a province. The
Canadian negotiators recommended that a provision be made for either a joint
commission or a royal commission to review the fiscal situation of Newfoundland
after eight or ten years of union to determine if it was able to carry on service at
prevailing levels without having to endure a heavier combined provincial and
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municipal level of taxation than the average in the Maritime Provinces.16 When
Canadian officials first raised this matter, they suggested a joint commission or a
royal commission consisting of one nominee of each of the Newfoundland and
Canadian governments and a chair selected jointly.17 However, when the final draft
of the terms was completed by Smallwood and Special Assistant to the Under-
Secretary of State for External Affairs R.A. MacKay, all references to a joint
commission were dropped. The proposed arrangement in 1947 for Newfoundland’s
entry into Confederation left the appointment of a commission solely to Canada. It
also added into the clause the important words “if any” to the form and scale of
additional financial assistance that might be needed to maintain the level of public
services reached within eight years of union.18 The Newfoundland delegation was
either uninterested in the role that Ottawa might play in the longer-term financial
viability of Newfoundland or was outsmarted by the Canadian negotiators. Either
way, the delegation failed to protect the financial interests of Newfoundland.
Even when the Newfoundland delegation returned to Ottawa in 1948 to negotiate
the final terms of union after the country voted narrowly for Confederation in a
second referendum, it readily and quickly accepted the proposed royal commission
that failed to give the province any role in its appointment and left with Ottawa all
decisions regarding the commission’s recommendations. This is surprising given
that Smallwood and other members of the delegation understood that the federal
government had steadfastly refused for years to provide assistance to the provinces
simply on the basis of fiscal need. In fact, on the same day early in the negotiations
that the two sides agreed on the financial review as negotiated in 1947, Smallwood
reminded his colleagues in the Newfoundland delegation that “the Federal
Government of Canada has consistently refused any request from the Provinces for
additional monies for the express purpose of meeting their fiscal needs and would
undoubtedly adopt the same attitude toward Newfoundland.”19 Yet when Term 29
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emerged as the major irritant in Ottawa-Newfoundland relations in the mid-1950s,
Smallwood was adamant that “without that clause [Term 29], there would have been
no Confederation.” Without it, he maintained, not only he but also F. Gordon
Bradley, the leader of the Confederate Association in Newfoundland, and all of the
other members of the Newfoundland delegation would have refused to sign the
terms of union. “Term 29,” he wrote in his 1973 autobiography, “was the most
important clause in the terms.”20 If this were the case, one must wonder why it was
among the first items settled – and with so little discussion. Ches Crosbie, the former
leader of the Party for Economic Union with the United States in the first
referendum, stood alone in arguing that the fiscal terms were inadequate and that the
promise of a royal commission failed to provide a sufficient measure of financial
security for Newfoundland.21 Crosbie was subsequently proven correct. The review
of Newfoundland’s financial position eight years after union gave all the advantages
to the Canadian government.22 The seeds of discord between Ottawa and
Newfoundland that emerged in 1959 were planted in the negotiations resulting from
the Terms of Union in 1948.
At the time of union, Newfoundland had a cash surplus of more than $40 million
dollars, but there were considerable demands on those dollars. It had a small
population dispersed over a huge territory – a population that increasingly
demanded improvements in the province’s health, education, and transportation
systems as well as the provision of services such as electricity and telephones to
allow them to catch up to the rest of North America. The province invested heavily
in those public services and, together with its rash industrialization schemes, ran
budgetary deficits in the range of $5 to $15 million per year throughout the 1950s.23
By 1953, with the province struggling with deficit financing, Smallwood came to
regard Term 29 as his primary lifeline. It would be through it that the federal
government would provide the fiscal resources that Newfoundland required to raise
its level and standards of public services. He wanted to be ready when Ottawa
appointed the royal commission,24 and to that end he appointed a provincial royal
commission in 1954 to prepare Newfoundland’s case for a revision to Term 29.
Lawyer and former Liberal MHA, Philip J. Lewis was appointed chair, and Albert
Perlin, Gerald S. Doyle, and Philip Gruchy were named commissioners. Carl
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Goldenberg, a well-known Montreal Liberal and labour lawyer, was one of the
economic advisors appointed to the commission.
The Newfoundland royal commission sat for more than three years, from January
1954 to April 1957, held more than 400 meetings, and heard testimony from more
than 100 individuals. It made two substantive recommendations: first, that Ottawa
provide Newfoundland with $15 million annually to maintain its level of public
services, and second, that Ottawa should continue periodically to review
Newfoundland’s fiscal situation and make additional payments when necessary to the
province. Smallwood used the commission’s report to demand an upward revision in
the financial terms of union. If there was no extra money coming from Ottawa, he
told a joint meeting of the Atlantic premiers and the Atlantic Provinces Economic
Council in Charlottetown in 1957, he would consider Confederation a failure.25
While Smallwood believed that all discussion of Term 29 had to occur within the
realm of high politics – at the level of first ministers, rather than of sectoral or low
politics – the initial discussions on Term 29 in Ottawa took place at the bureaucratic
level or within the realm of low politics. In 1956 R.M. Burns, the senior official in
the federal Department of Finance responsible for federal-provincial relations,
reminded K.W. Taylor, the deputy minister of finance, that the federal government
was constitutionally obligated to appoint a royal commission under Term 29 by the
end of March in 1957.26 Smallwood grew increasingly impatient with what he
considered Ottawa’s tardiness in the matter, and he reminded Prime Minister Louis
St. Laurent on several occasions during 1956 and 1957 that the royal commission was
vital to the future of Newfoundland. He urged him to appoint Canadians of “high
distinction, broad vision and sympathetic understanding” of the matter.27 Finally, at
the end of February 1957, St. Laurent appointed John B. McNair, the chief justice of
New Brunswick, Albert Walsh, by then the chief justice of Newfoundland, and
economist John J. Deutsch to the royal commission. Following the recommendations
of his officials, St. Laurent dismissed suggestions that the commissioners investigate
the general problems of the Atlantic Region; he tasked the commissioners for
“recommendations [that] will be strictly in accord with the terms of union.”28 St.
Laurent had warned his cabinet that there would undoubtedly be trouble with the
recommendations of the royal commission because Newfoundland was expecting
more than was provided in the Terms of Union and more than Ottawa could justify to
the other provinces. He lamented to his colleagues, quite prophetically, that
Newfoundland “would be disappointed eventually.”29 Premier Smallwood had
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already aroused concerns in Ottawa when he threatened on several occasions to lead
Newfoundland out of Confederation if the federal government did not act soon to
improve the economic situation in the four Atlantic provinces.30
The Department of Finance took the lead in all matters relating to the royal
commission in Ottawa. This can be seen, for instance, in the discussion around how
the federal government should be represented at the commission hearings that were
to begin in St. John’s on 19 June 1957. J.W. Pickersgill, Newfoundland’s
representative in the federal cabinet and private secretary to Prime Minister
Mackenzie King during the negotiations between Newfoundland and Canada in
1947 and 1948, had argued against the appointment of federal counsel because it
would suggest that the financial provisions of union were subject to litigation and
that Ottawa was prepared to confront Newfoundland over the matter. However, the
Department of Finance warned that the Newfoundland government was already
misrepresenting to the press and the public alike the meaning of Term 29 in
suggesting that Ottawa had no choice but to provide generous financial assistance to
bring the levels and standards of services up to those in the other Atlantic provinces
and even to those in Canada as a whole. It was no secret that Newfoundland would
ask the commission to recommend a generous subsidy. If Ottawa simply stayed on
the sidelines and watched the proceedings, federal officials maintained, there would
be no one to remind the royal commission of its limited mandate and to challenge
Premier Smallwood if he made preposterous requests such as demanding that
Ottawa improve the transportation facilities and make other improvements to public
services in Newfoundland.31 St. Laurent and his cabinet were worried that
Newfoundland might attempt to broaden the terms of reference of Term 29, and they
were “quite definite in the view that counsel for the Federal Government ought to
object to any attempt or tendency to broaden the scope of inquiry beyond the precise
terms of reference.” The Order-in-Council (P.C. 1957-27) appointing the Royal
Commission on Newfoundland Finances asked commissioners “to review the
financial position of the Province of Newfoundland and to recommend the form and
scale of additional financial assistance, if any, that may be required by the
Government of the Province of Newfoundland to enable it to continue public
services at the levels and standards reached subsequent to the date of Union, without
resorting to taxation more burdensome, having regard to capacity to pay, than that
obtaining generally in the region comprising the Maritime Provinces of Nova Scotia,
Acadiensis58
“Cabinet Conclusions,” 21 February 1957, Office of the Privy Council, ser. A-5-a, vol. 1892, file
Newfoundland Royal Commission to review financial position of province: appointment, LAC;
House of Commons Debates, 22 February 1957. Smallwood told the Charlottetown Guardian on
25 February 1959 that he was “delighted” at the choice of members for the royal commission. He
described McNair as a “long personal friend” and “a famous fighter for Maritime rights and after
we went in for Atlantic provinces rights,” Deutsch as “a great friend of Newfoundland and . . . a
man of great sympathy for Newfoundland,” and with Walsh, he said, “we would not find a better
man to represent Newfoundland on this royal commission.”
30 Burns to Harris, 26 February 1957, Department of Finance, vol. 3912, file 5765-05-01/vol. 3,
LAC. See also Ottawa Journal, 21 June 1955, and Toronto Star, 6 July 1955.
31 Taylor to Harris, 16 May 1957, including Memo “The Royal Commission on Newfoundland
Finances,” prepared by J.E. Howes, 14 May 1957, Department of Finance, vol. 3912, file 5765-
05-01/vol. 1 , LAC; see also Evening Telegram (St. John’s), 13 February 1957.
New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island.”32 The federal counsel was to present
Ottawa’s understanding of Term 29 and, it was hoped, avoid problems later on.
Although the federal government rarely presented briefs to the royal commissions it
appointed, it thought one might be necessary in this instance to rebut the evidence
that Newfoundland was expected to present at the hearings.33 Federal officials did not
trust Smallwood, and there was little indication that the federal government was
willing to negotiate and compromise with the Newfoundland premier. K.W. Taylor,
for example, told his minister that “it has been this Department’s view that if this
[Newfoundland’s fiscal capacity] must be considered it must be within the broad
pattern of Federal-Provincial fiscal relations and not in connection with the specific
and limited terms of Section 29 of the Terms of Union.”34
The commissioners cancelled the first of their public hearings scheduled for St.
John’s when John Diefenbaker and the Progressive Conservatives won a surprise
minority government on 10 June 1957. Even with the change of government,
though, the Department of Finance continued to be the government’s window on the
royal commission. Roland A. Ritchie, a Second World War veteran and Halifax
lawyer, was subsequently appointed federal counsel to the royal commission
hearings and his instructions were to correct any misinformation that was presented
there by Newfoundland.35 Finance also sent R.M. Burns and J.E. Howes, the
department’s experts on federal-provincial relations, to assist Ritchie.36
The hearings began in St. John’s on 22 July, and examined Newfoundland’s case.
Premier Smallwood’s was the first submission and he left little doubt about his
expectations of the commission. “My Lords,” he began, “you will by your
recommendation write the final, fateful term of the terms of Union.” He told the
commission that he had done everything he could to raise the levels and standards
of public services, including imposing high rates of taxation and spending all of the
$42 million surplus that the province had brought into Confederation. Still,
Newfoundland had only been able to reach the levels of public services enjoyed by
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick in 1920. Newfoundland had no more financial
resources to tap, and the hopes of all Newfoundlanders, he said, rested on the
generous recommendations of the royal commission.37
P.J. Lewis and H. Carl Goldenberg presented the details of Newfoundland’s case.
Using an array of statistics, they claimed that Newfoundland was clearly subjected to
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levels of taxation higher than those of the three Maritime provinces as it struggled to
maintain public services at the level and standards reached since 1949. Their
argument rested on four suppositions: first, personal incomes and personal incomes
per capita were lower in Newfoundland than those throughout the Maritimes; second,
the cost of living was 12 percent higher in Newfoundland; third, the burden of
taxation was greater on a proportional basis in Newfoundland than in the Maritimes;
and fourth, the level and standards of public services – transportation infrastructure,
education, health, public welfare, and local government services – were lower in
Newfoundland than in the Maritimes. The annual cost of maintaining public services
was $41.1 million, but when depreciation and the anticipated expenditures for
population growth were factored in the cost rose to $53 million. Revenue from a
variety of provincial and federal sources left the province with a budgetary deficit of
$15 million. Because Newfoundland taxpayers were already paying a higher level of
taxation than those in the Maritimes, Goldenberg told the commissioners the province
needed $15 million per annum under the Term 29 settlement to continue existing
levels and standards of public services. Newfoundland also demanded that Ottawa
continue to review its financial and economic position and provide additional
financial aid under Term 29 when necessary.38
Federal officials were dubious of Newfoundland’s claims made during the
hearings. They considered much of the presentation an enquiry into the social and
economic conditions in Newfoundland, which was clearly outside the royal
commission’s mandate. Roland Ritchie intervened at the hearings primarily to remind
the commissioners that any discussion of the alleged deficiencies in the levels and
standards of provincial government services in Newfoundland and the cost of
improving and reaching new levels and standards were clearly outside the terms of
reference of the royal commission. R.M. Burns agreed, but on a general basis he
thought there should be some federal assistance for Newfoundland on a limited term
because of the province’s particular circumstance. He also informed Donald Fleming,
the federal minister of finance, that the state of the social and economic position of
Newfoundland was not the subject of the review. Rather, it was the financial position
of the province; if the commission adhered to a strict interpretation of Term 29, then
it would have to recommend that Newfoundland had failed to show in its submission
that additional federal subsidies were required. The federal officials also dismissed
the provincial request for further reviews of Newfoundland’s fiscal capacity
stemming from the Terms of Union beyond the present royal commission. Ritchie
believed that the royal commission constituted the final disposition of the Terms of
Union, and insisted on the “finality of the Commission’s recommendation.” Finance
officials stressed the difficulties and inequities that would result in Ottawa’s handling
of the federal-provincial file if Newfoundland, alone of all the provinces, had the
right to have its problems reviewed by a succession of royal commissions.39
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When the royal commission moved to Ottawa in early October 1957, Robert
Duffy, a columnist for the Toronto Globe and Mail, described the two-day hearings
as the federal government’s attempt “to bring some pretty fanciful Newfoundland
economic thinking down to earth.”40 Officials in the Department of Finance
prepared Ottawa’s submission; there is no indication that Diefenbaker was involved
in any of the discussions about it. The 65-page submission expressed sympathy with
the general problems of the development of public services in the province, but it
reminded the commission that its task was not to solve the problems facing
Newfoundland. If the commission accepted Newfoundland’s recommendations, the
federal government would become “shackled by a fixed formula that is based upon
a combination of uncertain statistics, unprecedented economic theories, constructed
figures and future predictions.” It also urged the commissioners to abide with a strict
interpretation of the Terms of Union, and focus on the level of financial assistance
that was necessary for Newfoundland to continue to provide the level and standards
of public services reached since union in 1949; the commissioners should not be
driven by any sense of what the levels and standards of public services should be in
an ideal world.41 Ottawa also insisted that the commission’s recommendations
represented the final act under the Terms of Union; there was no provision in either
the Terms themselves or the commission’s mandate to re-open the issues raised by
Term 29 at a later date.42 The Department of Finance had insisted on the “finality of
any settlement under Term 29” since the issue had been first discussed in 1956; any
additional payments were part of the period of adjustment and had to be considered
part of the transitional assistance provided to Newfoundland.43 However,
Goldenberg reminded the commissioners that Canada had created a unique and
special arrangement for Newfoundland at the time of Confederation in 1949 that had
to be continued. Smallwood had the last word; he pleaded with the royal
commission to recommend a generous federal grant, and reminded the prime
minister that the commission’s recommendations were morally binding on the
Canadian government.44
The McNair Commission presented its report in July 1958, acknowledging that
Newfoundland had a long history of poverty and that the task of modernization that
lay ahead was going to be difficult. Confederation had helped to “remove the edge
of poverty” through transfer payments to individuals that had supplemented and
stabilized incomes of many Newfoundlanders. Still, the province remained far
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behind the national average on any measure of income and wealth. On the main
issue of levels of taxation, the commission concluded that the burden imposed in
Newfoundland was approximately equal to that of the Maritimes in a mathematical
sense. However, it noted that the element of burden could not simply be measured
in such austere terms; the commission also had to consider how the “special factors”
of Newfoundland’s situation affected the burden of taxation in the province and the
adequacy of future revenue to meet financial needs. In doing so, it noted several
factors: first, the greater vulnerability of the Newfoundland economy to exports than
that of the other Maritime provinces (which meant a great variation in annual
taxation revenues); second, lower levels of accumulated wealth and capital in
Newfoundland compared to those of the three Maritime provinces; third, lower per
capita incomes in Newfoundland; and fourth, a higher cost of living in
Newfoundland. Because of those special factors and the uncertainties in
Newfoundland’s economy, the commission recommended that Canada provide
additional financial assistance of $8 million per annum, minus the transitional grants
provided at the time of union for fiscal years 1958 to 1960.45
McNair pleased neither the federal nor the provincial government. Smallwood was
devastated. The royal commission had let him down. He had told Newfoundlanders
repeatedly in the years leading up to the review of Term 29 that Ottawa would provide
the financial resources the province required to meet future needs. In both the 1956
and the 1957 budget speeches, for instance, he noted “Newfoundland faces the future
with unwavering hope and confidence. She is part of the great Canadian nation and
she will go up with that nation. Great Canada wanted Newfoundland, and Great
Canada will treat her now with justice and generosity.”46 Smallwood, though, saw little
of that attitude in the commission’s report. It was “trash” he told the legislature,
adding: “The Commission was a dead loss. The Commissioners were a dead loss. God
help me, I had something to do with choosing them.”47
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Ottawa was no more impressed with the commission’s report than was St. John’s,
but for very different reasons. R.M. Burns, who had managed the file in the
Department of Finance, was “completely unimpressed” with the document and the
“cavalier manner” in which the commissioners treated the federal submission. While
acknowledging the difficult task the commissioners had faced, he felt that they had
made their decision based on a “feeling of sympathy” for Newfoundland rather than
on sound financial reasoning. The report was flawed both in principle and on
technical grounds, and he warned that if the federal government accepted the report
uncritically it might cause problems with the other Maritime Provinces – especially
Prince Edward Island, which was the poorest province in the region. With that in
mind, Burns reminded Fleming that “the cloudiness of Term 29 would seem to make
an arbitrary decision unavoidable and under the circumstances it must in the final
analysis quite properly be a political one based on an assessment of what appears
fair and equitable not only in Newfoundland, but to the rest of Canada as well.” He
noted, too, as Diefenbaker would when he tabled the report in the House of
Commons, that the decision on Term 29 brought “finality to the terms of union
between Newfoundland and Canada.” 48
It is worth noting that the Diefenbaker government was fundamentally opposed to
special deals for individual provinces; it had embraced a regional approach to economic
disparity. The Conservatives supported the principle of equalization that had been
introduced in 1956 as a means to address the social and economic disparity across the
country; they realized, also, that regional agreements were necessary to deal with
economically depressed regions of Canada. When Diefenbaker raised the matter of
financial adjustments to the general financial arrangements between the federal and
provincial governments at the Dominion-Provincial Conference in 1957, some of the
provinces voiced their dissatisfaction with what might be called side-agreements.
Douglas Campbell, the premier of Manitoba, represented that view, and he reminded
Diefenbaker that the federal government must ensure the equitable treatment of all
provinces. A national agreement was absolutely necessary, he insisted, and once such
an agreement was in place then the national government should provide additional
financial aid as it was needed in certain regions of the country.49 The participants at the
1957 Dominion-Provincial Conference agreed that the economic conditions and fiscal
situation in the Atlantic Provinces lagged that of the rest of the country, and that special
grants to them were justified.50 The federal government subsequently provided $22.5
million in adjustment grants for the Maritime Provinces in the Federal-Provincial Tax-
Sharing Arrangements Act for four fiscal years beginning in 1958. Newfoundland was
not originally included in those grants, as it was thought it would be covered by a
separate arrangement resulting from the royal commission examining Term 29. After
considerable lobbying by Premier Smallwood and Nova Scotia Premier Robert
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Stanfield, however, Newfoundland was included. The four provinces agreed on a
formula that saw 30 per cent of the adjustment grants going each to New Brunswick,
Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia while 10 per cent went to Prince Edward Island; the
adjustment grants were also increased to $30 million after Newfoundland was included.
Those special grants were to raise public services in Atlantic Canada to a level
comparable with those existing in the other provinces. Therefore, beginning in 1958
Newfoundland’s particular situation was addressed as part of regional strategy within
the larger context of the federal-provincial fiscal arrangement. The federal government
believed that when Smallwood accepted this arrangement he had abandoned the notion
of additional and special arrangements between Newfoundland and Ottawa.51
Still, the federal cabinet realized that it had to respond to the recommendations of
the McNair Commission; it would, however, take eight months to make a decision.
When Fleming first brought the subject forward in August 1958, he warned that
whatever the government decided would be a source of controversy – not only in
Newfoundland but possibly in other parts of Canada as well. For that reason, he
insisted that whatever arrangement was made it had to be the final settlement of the
Terms of Union.52 In cabinet, W.J. Browne, the minister representing Newfoundland,
urged his colleagues to provide the award of $8 million the McNair Commission had
recommended; to do otherwise would be seen as a refusal to help Newfoundland.
Browne insisted that the backwardness of public services generally in Newfoundland
in relation to those in other provinces made it a special case for federal help. The
cabinet, however, feared that given Smallwood’s strenuous objection to the McNair
recommendation any payment short of the $15 million would be decried by the
premier as insufficient; Smallwood had shown “absolutely no thanks” for the Atlantic
Province Adjustment funds. Moreover, he seemed to have no sense of financial probity
as he had spent the province’s pre-Confederation surplus recklessly. Some ministers
insisted that the federal government “should do nothing to strengthen” and encourage
such profligate and reckless fiscal tendencies by providing him additional funds.
Others suggested that the recommendations were unclear, and if they acted quickly to
provide the $8 million that McNair recommended it would be extremely difficult to
reduce the amount later even if a reduction were justified. In typical Diefenbaker
fashion, the cabinet procrastinated and decided further study was required.53
Diefenbaker’s procrastination allowed Smallwood time to build his case against
the McNair recommendation and mobilize the political forces in Newfoundland to
demand a more generous award. Malcolm Hollett, the leader of the opposition in
Newfoundland, joined Smallwood to denounce the inadequacy of the $8 million
award. They both hoped that Diefenbaker’s delay meant that Ottawa was working
on a richer arrangement for Newfoundland.54 Smallwood told the press that the
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prime minister “is deeply conscious as we all are, of the fact that what is involved
in this matter is the final writing of the Terms under which Newfoundland gave up
her independence within the Commonwealth and threw in her lot with Canada.” He
called on Diefenbaker for “big-hearted visions,” and asked him to make an interim
payment of $8 million as McNair had recommended so that the province could avoid
making drastic cuts to public services as a cost-saving measure in a difficult
financial year. The Newfoundland House of Assembly unanimously agreed upon the
request for an interim payment.55
Diefenbaker’s response foreshadowed the federal position on Term 29. He
reminded Smallwood that Ottawa had given Newfoundland nearly $9 million in
special grants (Atlantic Provinces Adjustment Grant and a transfer in tax revenues) in
the two years since the Conservatives came to power – which he also reminded the
premier exceeded the amount McNair recommended. Those payments should enable
the province to meet its current fiscal conditions. Ottawa realized, too, that an interim
payment would have tied the federal government to that amount as a minimum going
forward. Given its reservations about the McNair Report, the government refused to
provide an interim measure. After all, Diefenbaker told the premier, there had to be a
discussion about the amounts involved and the minister of finance would have to
handle those discussions – in essence, relegating the matter to low politics and away
from first ministers. At the same time, Diefenbaker was receiving warnings from
some in Newfoundland about how Smallwood had squandered the province’s fiscal
resources after Confederation. Arthur E. Harnett, the private secretary to W.J.
Browne, warned him that Smallwood had “total control of the province and no more
funds should be placed at his disposal.” The Newfoundland Board of Trade wrote the
prime minister informing him that it was more interested in infrastructure
improvements than in the financial arrangement between Newfoundland and
Ottawa.56 And Newfoundland Liberal Senator F. Gordon Bradley echoed these
sentiments, describing the federal government’s refusal to provide the level of
financial support that Smallwood demanded as “sound and practical.”57
For Smallwood, the McNair recommendation was an issue that could only be
discussed in the realm of high politics – that is, between premier and prime minister.
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This was not a matter for civil servants. Smallwood fired off a series of telegrams and
letters to Diefenbaker, asking for an opportunity to present a formal submission on the
inadequacy of the McNair recommendation. There was a “universal expectation” in
Newfoundland, he wrote Diefenbaker, that Ottawa be more generous than McNair had
been. He also reminded the prime minister that an additional financial award was the
province’s constitutional and provincial right under the Terms of Union, which were
included in the Canadian constitution.58 Smallwood’s request to send a delegation to
Ottawa arrived just as Diefenbaker was leaving for an extended tour of Commonwealth
countries in the fall of 1958 and, considering the issue to be simply another fiscal
arrangement between a province and the federal government, Diefenbaker thought it
would be best handled at the ministerial and bureaucratic level. He asked Smallwood
to send to Fleming any materials that would help his department understand
Newfoundland’s position and urged Smallwood and his officials to meet with Fleming
and Department of Finance officials. Smallwood refused; he would wait until the prime
minister’s return to Ottawa. This caused further delay in settling the matter.59
Although he did not realize it at the time, Smallwood might have fared better in
the fall of 1958 with officials in the Department of Finance than waiting for the prime
minister. While finance officials continued to insist that the McNair recommendation
was flawed and not supported by the facts, they understood better than the cabinet
that Term 29 had the potential to disrupt relations between St. John’s and Ottawa.
They recommended what was essentially a political solution. R.M. Burns and others
in the Department of Finance, worried about the precarious fiscal situation in
Newfoundland, realized that the province needed help. Burns told Taylor that the
department would have to deal with the situation in Newfoundland eventually, and if
the government accepted the McNair recommendation it would do the “least harm”
to the relations between the two governments – and it might even strengthen Ottawa’s
position in Newfoundland. Burns noted, too, that Smallwood saw – just as the
Newfoundland royal commission had – that the financial compensation from Term 29
was the only possible way to improve public services in Newfoundland as well as the
best way of dealing with the current fiscal crisis in the province. Because
Newfoundland never considered the primary issue as simply being the continuation
of the level of services reached since 1949, it dismissed any notion of adhering to a
strict interpretation of Term 29. This view was reflected in the 1956 Budget Speech,
when Newfoundland’s minister of finance emphasized the inadequacy of government
services in Newfoundland compared to that in the Maritime Provinces and said that
those differences illustrate “the fundamental character of our need for substantial
improvements in the amount we are to get each year under Term 29.” Moreover,
Burns wondered if it were proper for Ottawa to amend or alter the McNair
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recommendation. The royal commission was constitutionally mandated and had a
“quasi-sacrosanct nature,” even if its final report was economically and financially
suspect. He thought that acceptance of the McNair recommendation, even if it was
excessive, would result in the least controversy: “Anything less,” he recommended,
“might do more harm to the long-term relations with the Province and its attitude
toward Confederation, than the money would be worth.” With that in mind, Burns
recommended that Ottawa accept the McNair recommendation beginning in 1957-58
for a limited period, ending in either 1962 or 1967 to coincide with the quinquennial
renegotiations of the principal fiscal arrangements. Even as he told the deputy
minister this, he noted that there was some “natural disinclination to provide
additional unconditional funds to the Province in view of its record of financial
profligacy.”60
Fleming forwarded the recommendation from Burns to the prime minister, but
neither Fleming nor Diefenbaker saw the matter as particularly pressing (though
they would eventually accept the Department of Finance’s recommendation). The
department, however, became increasingly worried with the delay, and, on 2 January
1959, nearly five months after the cabinet first considered the matter, Taylor urged
Fleming to make a decision on the McNair Commission. The issue, he told his
minister, “may become an embarrassing constitutional matter . . . [and] it will be
difficult to justify giving less than what the report recommends”; to do otherwise
would result in a “rather nasty row” with Newfoundland. However, the government
had to fix a terminal date for the award and Taylor recommended 31 March 1967,
when the Federal-Provincial Tax Sharing Arrangement Act was to be renegotiated
and Newfoundland’s situation would be reviewed and considered with that of the
other Atlantic Provinces.61 Fleming urged Diefenbaker to accept the department’s
advice; the matter was discussed in the cabinet on 13 January 1959, but a decision
was deferred until the prime minister met with Smallwood.62
Smallwood’s visit to Ottawa tilled familiar terrain, but he also came with a new
proposal for Diefenbaker. He reminded the prime minister of Canada’s
constitutional obligation under Term 29, and told him that the resolution of the
matter was “a final act in the Terms of Union with Canada and that generosity on the
part of Canada would pay dividends in the more whole-hearted acceptance of
Confederation in the Province.”63 Yet he was also willing to compromise: he
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suggested that if Ottawa could not meet Newfoundland’s demands within the
purview of the McNair Commission then perhaps it might consider some other form
of financial aid to satisfy Newfoundland. Would Ottawa assume responsibility for
some public service that was a burden to the province, such as assuming the full cost
of the TransCanada Highway and the cost of constructing new roads throughout the
province? Federal officials dismissed such overtures as they would surely create
problems in Ottawa’s relations with the other provinces; Diefenbaker also refused to
negotiate, but he was left wondering if Smallwood’s earlier demands of a $15
million minimum under Term 29 had been more bluster than substance. Smallwood
continued to insist on additional reviews of his province’s fiscal situation.64
Fleming and Diefenbaker took the Term 29 recommendation to the Cabinet on 5
March 1959. The first order of business on the agenda that day was a labour dispute in
Newfoundland that further heightened the cabinet’s suspicion of and antipathy towards
Smallwood. The International Woodworkers of America (IWA) had organized loggers
in Newfoundland and had launched a strike on New Year’s Day against the Anglo-
Newfoundland Development Company, which owned the paper mill in Grand Falls. On
7 February, strikers raided a logging camp working for contractors hired by the
company to cut pulp wood and sent loggers scrambling into the winter night. A few
days later, on 13 February, Premier Smallwood unleashed the might of his government
against the union, which he castigated as “outsiders” intent on destroying the peace and
tranquility of Newfoundland; he announced plans to decertify the IWA and establish his
own loggers union that, he said, would be willing to negotiate sensibly with the paper
company. The legislation was among the most punitive anti-labour bills in Canadian
history, and the Canadian labour movement appealed to the federal government to
disallow it. Davie Fulton, the minister of justice, told the cabinet that the Canadian
Labour Congress planned formally to request that the federal government instruct the
lieutenant-governor of Newfoundland to either disallow or reserve the Newfoundland
legislation proposing to decertify the IWA and bar the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters from the province.65
The Diefenbaker government opposed Smallwood’s legislation. It was
embarrassed that the Conservative members of the Newfoundland legislature had
supported Smallwood’s attack on labour.66 The federal cabinet discussed using its
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constitutional privilege either to reserve or disallow the legislation, but decided
against such action after a protracted discussion. The Progressive Conservatives had
traditionally been the party of provincial rights, and most ministers realized that the
provinces jealously guarded their powers; federal use of the powers of reservation
and disallowance of provincial law would surely come with an immense political
cost. Reluctantly, the cabinet decided not to interfere with the Newfoundland
legislation; the episode, though, served as an indication for Ottawa of how ruthless
and undemocratic Smallwood and his government had become.67
With its decision on the Newfoundland labour legislation rendered, the cabinet
turned to the McNair Report. Diefenbaker and Fleming reported that their meetings
with Smallwood had failed to find any resolution. Given that Smallwood was
willing to negotiate over Term 29, however, they suggested that he was no longer
committed to the issue as a matter of principle. The cabinet had two options:
recognize its obligation under Term 29 and pay the amount McNair Commission had
recommended, or refuse its recommendation. Diefenbaker and Fleming argued that
the federal government had no alternative other than to implement the
recommendations of the royal commission if they were to “keep faith with the Terms
of Union with Newfoundland.” Fleming proposed that cabinet authorize the $8
million annual payment as the royal commission had recommended and the
Department of Finance had endorsed. The award would continue without any
conditions until 1966-67; Newfoundland had to understand, however, that no further
supplementary benefits would be considered. The grant was a “final and irrevocable
settlement of Term 29, and any future payment to Newfoundland [was to] be
divorced from the Terms of Union and considered as part of a general fiscal
arrangement between Ottawa and the provinces.”68
The proposal spawned considerable debate in the cabinet. Of course, it was soon
evident that policy could not be separated from politics. All members of the cabinet
fully understood that Smallwood was “politically hostile” to the Conservatives, and
because of that it never seriously entertained Smallwood’s demand for a $15 million
award.69 Moreover, even the Department of Finance, which favoured a political
settlement with Newfoundland, rejected Smallwood’s demand for $15 million. The
cabinet realized that if it gave Smallwood the full amount he requested, he would
take full credit for Ottawa’s generosity and the federal government would receive
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scant praise for the Term 29 award (with no political gain for the Conservatives in
Newfoundland). The cabinet also considered how reckless Smallwood had
reportedly been with Newfoundland’s financial resources after 1949, a view shared
by the Department of Finance; Browne reminded his colleagues that Smallwood had
stated publicly that if he were granted the award in perpetuity as he had demanded
he would use it to borrow $175 million and repay the loan over a 15-year period.
Limiting the term of the financial award under Term 29 would make it more
difficult, cabinet believed, for Smallwood to increase the indebtedness of
Newfoundland, an issue that increasingly worried the Department of Finance in
Ottawa. The cabinet was also concerned that if the award were given in perpetuity
it might mean that the Newfoundland government would see the federal treasury as
its protector no matter how it squandered its revenue; perpetuity, from this point of
view, would surely not encourage prudent financial management in the province.70
The cabinet agreed with Fleming that it should offer no more than the $8 million
the McNair Commission had recommended. Yet it also realized that it could not
punish the people of Newfoundland for Smallwood’s profligacy.71 In the long-term
interest of promoting Newfoundland’s integration into Canada it had to provide
some measure of financial assistance under Term 29. The cabinet accepted
Fleming’s recommendation. However, it maintained that Smallwood should be
admonished for his alleged financial waste and for his hostility to the Conservatives.
It did so by refusing Fleming’s recommendation to provide the award until 1967; it
set 1962 as the termination date – the alternative offered by the Department of
Finance. From that point forward, Newfoundland would participate in the federal-
provincial fiscal arrangements on the same basis as all the other provinces. Such an
arrangement would signal the integration of Newfoundland into Canada, and it
would mean that Newfoundland would not be “treated perpetually as an orphan” but
would join the rest of Canada as far as the method of providing fiscal assistance to
the provinces was concerned. Yet, as the Atlantic Adjustment Grants demonstrated,
that did not mean that special fiscal arrangements could not be negotiated between
any province (or region) and the federal government. In the end, Fleming and
Diefenbaker both agreed that Newfoundland had “fared well in financial assistance
from the federal government since we [the Conservatives] took office.”72
Before the federal government announced its decision on the McNair Commission
recommendation, the IWA strike in Newfoundland became more violent and further
strained relations between St. John’s and Ottawa. Diefenbaker was under considerable
pressure from labour groups and some elements in the press either to disallow or have
the lieutenant-governor reserve the new labour laws passed by the Smallwood
government. As much as Diefenbaker wanted to do so, his government realized that it
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was political suicide to get involved in matters, such as labour laws, that fell within
provincial jurisdiction. Federal intervention smacked of a centralization of power in
Ottawa, something that Diefenbaker had railed against for years.
Although Diefenbaker was able to skate around Smallwood’s labour legislation,
he soon became embroiled in another controversy with Smallwood when the
Newfoundland attorney-general requested additional Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP) officers to deal with the insecurity created in Newfoundland during
the IWA strike. Under the terms of the policing contract between the federal
government and the province, a request could not be legally denied unless the
attorney-general of Canada determined that the RCMP was unavailable because of
a crisis elsewhere. Both federal Minister of Justice Fulton and RCMP Commissioner
L.H. Nicholson – as well as a cabinet committee appointed to study Newfoundland’s
request – believed that the federal government had no legal option but to grant
Newfoundland’s request. The commissioner threatened to resign if Ottawa refused
to send additional officers. Diefenbaker stood alone in cabinet; he believed that
Smallwood was playing politics with the IWA strike, and he insisted that the RCMP
could not be seen to be engaged in a labour dispute in which they might be regarded
as strikebreakers. Smallwood had become personally involved in the labour dispute,
and Diefenbaker was adamant that the integrity of the RCMP should not be
compromised even if Ottawa had to break a contract with the province to do so.73
Diefenbaker’s decision on the RCMP was a political one, though the opposition
parties, including Pearson’s Liberals, did not criticize the prime minister for his
decision not to dispatch additional RCMP officers; the federal Liberals were clearly
embarrassed by Smallwood’s actions.74
Smallwood was outraged, however, and so was much of Newfoundland. He
turned Ottawa’s refusal to dispatch additional RCMP officers, and the widespread
condemnation throughout Canada of Smallwood’s intervention in the strike, into a
struggle of Newfoundland against the outsider. An Evening Telegram headline
proclaimed “They Do Not Understand” – a cry that was later echoed by Minister of
Education Fred Rowe. Don Jamieson, a prominent broadcaster and later Liberal MP,
told the Toronto Star they “just don’t understand us . . . after ten years, Canadians
haven’t a clue about us.” The Daily News, a strong Liberal supporter, turned to what
it described as “The Inadequacies of Mr. Diefenbaker.” It also defended Smallwood
and charged that Diefenbaker did not understand the situation in Newfoundland.
Where did he get the audacity, it asked, to declare that the premier had gravely
aggravated the labour dispute? The Daily News listed Diefenbaker’s inadequacies
and his neglect of Newfoundland: he had unduly and excessively delayed the
implementation of the McNair recommendation, he had failed to fill the position of
chief justice of the Newfoundland Supreme Court, and he had refused to send
reinforcements to provide peace and security in Newfoundland.75
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It was within this vortex of poisoned politics, fervent nationalism, and
Smallwood’s populist appeal that had been whipped up in Newfoundland that
Diefenbaker rose in the House of Commons on 25 March 1959, just six days before
the tenth anniversary of Confederation, to announce his government’s decision on
Term 29. He reviewed the significance of Term 29, the work of the royal
commission, the Government of Newfoundland’s opposition to the McNair
recommendation, and his government’s study of the report. Parliament would be
asked to authorize a special annual payment of $8 million until 1962 under Term 29
as the McNair Commission had recommended. Finance officials had used the words
“final and irrevocable” frequently in the months during which they had discussed the
McNair Commission’s recommendations; those words had simply meant there
would be no further review of Newfoundland fiscal capacity as Smallwood had
demanded. Yet when Prime Minister Diefenbaker uttered those exact words he could
not have chosen any more incendiary language given the situation then existing in
Newfoundland, even if the phrase had been part of the vocabulary around Term 29
for several years: “The proposed payments will be unconditional and will be in final
and irrevocable settlement of the provisions of article 29 and the contractual
obligations of the union consummated in 1949.”76 As he sat down, Diefenbaker
realized his error.
The reaction in Newfoundland was as fierce as it was predictable. Smallwood
was already smarting over Diefenbaker’s decision to refuse additional RCMP
officers during the IWA strike and the federal government’s portrayal of him as a
dictator intent on using the power of the state to crush a labour union.
Diefenbaker’s provocative phrase regarding Term 29 played into Smallwood’s
hand, and he launched a full-pitched battle to bring the prime minister to heel.
Diefenbaker had turned a joyous celebration into one of sorrow and despair.
Smallwood described Ottawa’s decision as an “unspeakable betrayal of
Newfoundland” and ordered three days of official mourning. Flags were hung at
half-mast and the doors around government buildings were draped in black.
Smallwood, himself, donned black coat and black hat to lead the mourning and to
excoriate the province’s new enemy. Students at Memorial University took to the
streets in anger. When they arrived at the Colonial Building, the famed home of the
Newfoundland assembly, carrying placards that read “Secede,” Smallwood told
them that the “rest of Canada is ready to rise up in rebellion against Mr.
Diefenbaker’s betrayal of Newfoundland.” That night they burned Diefenbaker in
effigy. The formal dinner to mark the tenth anniversary of union was cancelled; a
dinner was held in Smallwood’s honour instead.77
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The press across Canada expressed sympathy for Newfoundland and expressed
bewilderment both at Diefenbaker’s timing and his cavalier and supercilious handling
of the announcement, even if many supported the principle behind the federal position.
The Toronto Globe and Mail best captured the sentiment outside Newfoundland: it was
“an example of doing the right thing in the wrong way, at the wrong time.” And Gwyn
wrote “mystifyingly, Diefenbaker had staked out all the low ground for himself.”78 Yet
the federal decision followed the pattern that had been in place in Ottawa since 1949 in
its dealing with Newfoundland. The decision had its origins in the federal bureaucracy
and it was not solely Diefenbaker’s decision, as had been the case with the
government’s refusal to dispatch RCMP officers to the province; the decision was the
one recommended by senior officials in the Department of Finance and essentially
accepted by the cabinet with very minor changes. The Tory cabinet agreed with the
recommendation of its officials that the financial position of Newfoundland should not
be considered separately from that of the other provinces after 1962, when the existing
federal-provincial fiscal arrangements were set for re-negotiation. The cabinet agreed
that there should be no exceptions made for Newfoundland nor should it be “treated as
an orphan in perpetuity”; it was also agreed that the province should “join” the rest of
Canada in 1962 and be part of the national process that decided financial assistance to
the provinces.79 In this, the Conservative government acted as the Liberal government
had since discussions first began with Newfoundland in 1947.
Yet when Diefenbaker made the announcement, he did so without explanation or
empathy. Moreover, he had failed to realize the importance of the tenth anniversary
of union to Newfoundlanders and how Smallwood might exploit the occasion if he
did not get the concession from Ottawa he wanted. Despite its insistence that
Newfoundland had to be treated no differently than the other provinces, the
Department of Finance had suggested to Diefenbaker on a couple of occasions that
Ottawa take the high ground on Term 29 and use it to strengthen the positive attitude
in Newfoundland towards Confederation. That he did not have an effective regional
minister from Newfoundland to make a strong case for the province only
exacerbated the situation. Browne never made a passionate and convincing case for
his province in cabinet; on the contrary, he frequently reminded his colleagues of
Smallwood’s waste and inappropriate spending and urged Ottawa not to provide him
with the means to continue with such profligacy. Moreover, he failed to warn
Diefenbaker and the cabinet how Smallwood had successfully manipulated much of
the province to believe that the IWA was an epic struggle with an outside
organization that threatened to destroy the peace and tranquility of Newfoundland
and that he was sure to use the same rhetoric against Ottawa if he failed to secure
the agreement he desired under Term 29. With his announcement Diefenbaker
handed Smallwood a bludgeon with which to beat Ottawa, and a very useful
platform from which to attack the Conservative government.
For Smallwood, the Term 29 settlement became another issue of the failure of
outsiders – this time, the prime minister of Canada – to understand how the historical
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and comparative circumstances of Newfoundland made it not just different from the
other provinces but also extraordinary and exceptional. For Smallwood, it was an issue
of “us against the rest of Canada – the people of Canada just don’t understand
Newfoundland.” What Diefenbaker failed to realize was that many in Newfoundland
believed that by treating Newfoundland equally with the other provinces, without
taking the province’s historical development into consideration, really amounted to
discrimination against it.80 For Smallwood, the exceptionalism of Newfoundland
within Canada had to be maintained. Diefenbaker, he charged, had not understood the
province’s historical development outside of Canada, nor the tremendous odds that the
province faced even within Confederation; nor did he understand that special fiscal
arrangements were essential for Newfoundland to develop and catch up with the rest
of Canada. If all went extraordinarily well, it would have taken perhaps a generation
for Newfoundland to bridge the gap in public services that existed between it and the
rest of Canada. Moreover, Canada had desperately wanted Confederation, and the
treaty to bring Newfoundland into the fold, Smallwood maintained, came with an
implicit promise to make life better for Canada’s newest citizens. Smallwood’s
reaction to Diefenbaker’s decision was not without an eye to political opportunism, but
it was also based on his staunch Newfoundland nationalism.
Diefenbaker never trusted Smallwood after their fight over Term 29, but in 1961,
during the federal-provincial conference on fiscal arrangements between the
provinces and Ottawa, Diefenbaker extended the McNair payments to Newfoundland
for an additional five-year period to include the fiscal year 1966-67 as part of the
Federal-Provincial Tax-Sharing Arrangements Act.81 Smallwood wrote in his planner
that the offer was “not too bad for Newfoundland.”82 During the 1962 federal election
campaign, Liberal opposition leader L.B. Pearson promised to enshrine in statute the
permanency of the special payments to Newfoundland. Smallwood delivered six of
seven seats to the Liberals, but Diefenbaker hung on with a minority government only
to be defeated a year later when the Liberals claimed a slim minority – helped in no
small part by winning all seven Newfoundland seats. Delighted that Diefenbaker was
finally defeated, Smallwood went to Ottawa and watched from the public gallery as
Pearson and his government took their seats in Parliament on 27 May 1963. Pearson
kept his election promise and introduced legislation for the annual payments to
Newfoundland, which continued until a cash-strapped Newfoundland government
negotiated a lump-sum payment of $50 million that relieved the federal government
of its obligation until 2016 (when the matter is due to be again negotiated). When
those negotiations take place, however, Ottawa will have no constitutional obligation
to resume the payments.
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